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Over the past twenty years, economists have invested a good deal of effort in
studying the economic, political and institutional determinants of fiscal policy.1 Part
of that literature has focused on fiscal rules – commitments by political leaders to
certain norms of fiscal behaviour. The creation of the European Monetary Union
(EMU) and the related Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) provided strong motivation
to examine all aspects of fiscal rules and their impact on fiscal policy in Europe.
At the same time, a parallel literature was developing in the area of public
sector accounting. Professional accounting bodies like the International Federation
of Accountants (IFAC) began to advocate that traditional methods of accounting for
public sector activities be changed to mirror more closely accounting in the private
sector. International organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have
also recommended such changes in public sector accounting regimes.
With the economic impacts of various fiscal rules now relatively well
understood and the political determinants of fiscal policy extensively studied,
attention has turned to the impact of budget institutions on fiscal policy outcomes.2
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to this emerging literature by examining
the interaction of accounting regimes and fiscal rules. In particular, we look at the
incentives for policy makers that are created when governments change the way that
they account for capital – a change that is currently underway in Canada and a
number of other countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. A brief look at some
relevant literature concludes this introduction. We next develop a simple, dynamic
simulation model of a government budget to aid in analyzing the accounting
regime-fiscal rule interaction. The model is first employed to examine the impact of
accounting regimes on some standard fiscal rules related to deficits, government
debt and the accumulation of public-sector capital. We then turn to the incentives
created by accounting regimes when governments have preferences regarding the
mix of capital versus operating spending or find themselves in different fiscal
—————
∗ Professor and Director, Institute for Public Economics – University of Alberta, EnCana Scholar in Public
Policy, CD Howe Institute. Paper prepared for the Banca d’Italia Fiscal Policy Workshop, Perugia, April
2004. The views expressed in this paper are my own and should not be attributed to any other individual
or institution. I am grateful to R. Boothe for valuable research assistance.
1 For a recent survey, see Alesina and Perotti (1999).
2 For example, see Poterba and von Hagen (1999).
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circumstances regarding starting values for deficits, debts or capital stock. The
recent experience of Canadian provinces is briefly reviewed before we offer some
policy conclusions.
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According to Tanzi (2003), the virtues of a balanced budget have long been
recognized. He cites as his authorities well-know historical figures such as Cicero,
David Hume and George Washington (p. 4). While it is unlikely that such
individuals concerned themselves with public sector accounting, Wynne (2003) tells
us that the cash basis of accounting has been used to measure fiscal balance for the
last 150 years.3 Of course, regardless of accounting regime, there are many
methodological issues related to the measurement of fiscal balance (Blejer and
Cheasty, 1991). As well, fiscal rules are more or less effective depending on their
design and a host of other, external factors (Kopits, 2001).4
Research has shown that one of the key external factors affecting fiscal policy
outcomes is budget institutions. For example, Poterba and von Hagen claim that
“[h]igher levels of transparency are associated with lower budget deficits.” Further,
they go on to argue that “…institutions must themselves be regarded as endogenous.
The questions when, and why, governments adopt institutional reforms remain
important challenges for future research in the political economy of fiscal policy”
(p. 4).
An important institutional reform currently underway in developed countries
is the move from cash to accrual accounting for capital. Analysts’ views on this
change are mixed. Proponents argue that such a change will correct an inherent bias
against the accumulation of public sector capital inherent in a cash accounting
regime.5 For example, Balassone and Franco (2001) point to the double burden of
transition to balanced budget and lower debt levels and the impact of consolidated
balance fiscal rules on public investment.
However, others are less supportive of the move to accrual accounting for
capital. They cite the benefits flowing from the simplicity of cash
—————
3 It is useful at this point to define more precisely the terms “cash” and “accrual” accounting. Until recently,
many governments in developed countries have employed what accountants call “modified accrual
accounting”. Under this accounting regime, physical capital is treated as an expenditure in the year it is
constructed and no depreciation of the capital is charged as an expense in subsequent years. Because we
are focusing in this paper on the accounting treatment of capital, we will call this regime “cash
accounting”. We will call the regime where capital is not expensed and depreciation is charged “accrual
accounting”. This corresponds to what accountants sometimes call “full accrual”.
4 For example, von Hagen HW DO (2002) show that fiscal consolidation based on expenditure reductions
more likely to succeed than those based on revenue increases. This is confirmed for Canada in Boothe and
Reid (2001).
5 Proponents include Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Brunila HWDO (2001), Buti HWDO (2992), Dur HWDO
(1997), Robinson (1999) and Salinas (2002).
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accounting-including accountability and ease of administration.6 For example, Tanzi
(2003) quotes Financial Times columnist John Plender’s 2003 article that argues that
“…the further the budget discussion moves from cash, the greater the risk of
becoming lost in the fiscal fog of war” (April 4, 2003, p. 18). Indeed Canada’s
Public Sector Accounting Board recommends that the cash accounting focus on the
government deficit be replaced with five separate measures under accrual
accounting (PSAB, 2003).
In this paper, we take no position on the desirability of cash versus accrual
accounting regimes for the public sector. Rather, we take our inspiration from
Poterba and von Hagen to look at when and why governments may choose to move
from one accounting regime to the other.
 	
To help analyze the interaction of fiscal rules and accounting regimes, we
construct a simple, dynamic model of a government budget. The equations
describing the model are presented in Table 1. The model is recursive and
deterministic, combining accounting identities with government behaviour described
by various fiscal rules. We begin by describing a cash accounting regime.
 	

The revenue side of the government budget is exogenous. Total revenue, ,
grows at the (exogenous) growth rate of the economy, . Total expenditure, , is the
sum of transfers to individuals and firms, , gross public sector investment, ,
services to individuals and firms, , and debt service payments, . The budget
surplus, , is simply the difference between total revenue and total expenditure. The
model is closed by a budget-balance rule where  is determined residually to
ensure =0 in each period.
Investment is determined by fiscal rule for capital accumulation. In this basic
model, the government sets the capital-revenue ratio, , equal to a constant, so
that  is set to ensure the desired growth in the capital stock is realized, 
 so that
 =  (–1). Services are provided by operating public capital and are set equal to a
fixed proportion, a, of last period’s capital stock. Debt service costs are determined
by applying the interest rate on government debt/assets, r, to the last period stock of
government financial assets/debt, !(–1). The capital stock depreciates, , at a
constant rate, . The model is completed by identities that account for the growth of
K and A.
—————
6 Skeptics include Wynne (2003) and Tanzi (2003). Diamond (2002) is cautious in recommending the
change to developing countries that may not have the systems in place to support accrual accounting.
 3DXO%RRWKH
 	
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 =(1+)* (–1) total revenue (1)
 =  +  +  +  total expenditure (2)
 =  –  Surplus (3)
 =  –  –  –  transfers expenditure (no deficit rule) (4)
 = *(–1) +  gross public investment (constant K/R rule) (5)
= *(–1) services expenditure (6)
 = –*!(–1) debt service expenditure (7)
 = *(–1) Depreciation (8)
 = (–1) – *(–1) +  capital stock (9)
! = !(–1) +  financial assets (10)
!"		#	
Replace (2), (4) and (10) with:
 =  +  +  +  total expenditure (11)
 =  –  –  –  transfers expenditure (no operating deficit
rule)
(12)
! = !(–1) +  – ( – ) financial assets (13)
$ "
 is total revenue
 is revenue (economy) growth rate
 is total expenditure
 is transfer expenditure
 is services expenditure
 is debt service
 is surplus
 is gross investment
 is cost of operating capital
 is capital stock
 is interest rate on financial assets/debt
! is financial assets/debt
 is depreciation
 is depreciation rate
$FFRXQWLQJ5HJLPHVDQG)LVFDO5XOHV 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To transform the basic cash accounting model of the government budget into
one that conforms to an accrual accounting regime, we modify the definition of total
expenditure and accumulation identity for government financial assets/debt. Under
accrual accounting, spending on public sector capital is excluded from total
expenditure, while the depreciation of public sector capital is included. Thus
equation (2) becomes:
#$$$ (11)
The anti-deficit rule under an accrual accounting regime become a
anti-“operating deficit” rule. Thus, equation (4) becomes:
#%%% (12)
As we shall see, the change in the fiscal rule from no cash deficit to no
operating deficit has important implications for budget outcomes.
The accumulation identity for government financial assets/debt, equation
(10), becomes:
! = !(–1) +  – ( – ) (13)
In words, any net investment in capital that cannot be financed from the
government’s operating surplus must be financed by borrowing.
& '	

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To run simulations we need to calibrate the model by specifying parameters
and starting values for variables. The parameters and starting values are presented in
Table 2 and are chosen to roughly correspond to the budget of the Canadian
province of Alberta.7 Revenues are set at $20 billion and grow at an annual rate of 5
per cent. The budget is initially in balance. Public sector capital and government rate
on government debt are both set at 5 per cent. The ongoing cost of providing
government services is equal to 25 per cent of the capital stock. Investment is chosen
to maintain a constant ratio of capital to revenue and transfers are determined
residually to ensure budget balance.
% 	 &'	("	)
To establish a benchmark, we begin by looking at what we describe as a
“double-virtue” government, where “virtues” refer to components of their fiscal
rules. In this benchmark case, the first virtue is a rule for the accumulation of public
—————
7 In reality, the Province of Alberta is a net creditor rather than a net debtor.
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	%
*" #	$"
 0.05  20.00
 0.25  20.00
 0.05  16.17
 0.05  0.95
 2.35
 0.50
 10.00
 0.48
! –10.00
sector capital, 
 that a constant ratio of capital to revenue be maintained, 
.
= 2.8 The second virtue is an anti-deficit rule, 
 = 0. Under a cash regime,
the two rules imply that a portion of current revenue must be reserved to fund new
capital. Under an accrual regime, capital accumulation can be financed by
borrowing.
Figure 1 shows the results produced by the interaction of the accounting
regimes and the fiscal rules. We see that the level of financial debt is constant under
cash accounting, growing with accrual accounting. The mix of spending also differs
across accounting regimes. In the case of the cash regime, capital spending is
financed by current revenue, reducing the revenue available for other purposes. In
the accrual regime, capital spending is partially financed by borrowing, leaving more
revenue available for other purposes. However, as debt accumulates so do interest
charges, which reduces the revenue available for other spending. Under the current
parameterization, at the ten-year horizon, the former effect outweighs the latter and
transfers are greater under accrual than under cash accounting.9
The results presented in Figure 1 lead to a well-known, but nevertheless
important policy implication. Changes in accounting regimes may require
corresponding changes to fiscal rules. Maintaining the same fiscal rules while
changing accounting regimes, may result in important changes in the trajectory of
public debt and the mix of expenditures over time.
—————
8 It is easy to imagine that revenues grow in line with nominal GDP, making this a ./*'3 rule.
9 It is important to note that the differences between the results produced by the two regimes are sensitive to
parameterization. The most important differences come from the choice of the growth rate of revenue, J.
When J equals zero rather than 0.5, the results from the two models are equivalent, LH debt and capital
are unchanged and investment is confined to depreciation. When Jequals –0.5, investment is zero and
debt is repaid under the accrual regime using the cash generated by expensing depreciation.
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Financial Assets
Constant  K/R + No  Deficits
–18
–12
–6
0
Cash  (10.00)  (10.00)  (10.00)  (10.00)  (10.00)  (10.00)  (10.00)  (10.00)  (10.00)  (10.00)  (10.00)
Accr ual  (10.00)  (10.50)  (11.03)  (11.58)  (12.16)  (12.76)  (13.40)  (14.07)  (14.77)  (15.51)  (16.29)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Program Expense + Investment
Cash Regime: Constant K/R + No Deficits
0
10
20
30
I  0.95  1.00  1.05  1.10  1.16  1.22  1.28  1.34  1.41  1.48  1.55 
SER  2.38  2.50  2.63  2.76  2.89  3.04  3.19  3.35  3.52  3.69  3.88 
TRN  16.17  17.00  17.88  18.79  19.76  20.77  21.83  22.95  24.12  25.36  26.65 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Capital
Constant  K/R + No Deficits
0
5
10
15
Cash  10.00  10.50  11.03  11.58  12.16  12.76  13.40  14.07  14.77  15.51  16.29 
Accr ual  10.00  10.50  11.03  11.58  12.16  12.76  13.40  14.07  14.77  15.51  16.29 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Program Expense + Investment
Accrual Regime: Constant  K/R + No  Deficits
0
10
20
30
I  0.95  1.00  1.05  1.10  1.16  1.22  1.28  1.34  1.41  1.48  1.55 
SER  2.38  2.50  2.63  2.76  2.89  3.04  3.19  3.35  3.52  3.69  3.88 
TRN  16.17  17.50  18.38  19.29  20.26  21.27  22.33  23.45  24.62  25.86  27.15 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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To be fair to advocates of accrual accounting for the public sector, the need
for new fiscal rules and corresponding indicators to accompany the change of
accounting regime has long been recognized.10 One such rule change is to focus
attention on changes in government debt rather than deficits. In this section, we
replace our “anti-deficit” rule with a rule that requires that a constant ratio of debt to
revenue be maintained,  /=2.11 We retain our rule regarding the ratio of capital
to revenue from the previous section.
To implement the new rule under the cash accounting regime, we modify
equation (4) so that now transfers ensure that a constant debt/revenue ratio is
maintained:
 =  + *(–1) – 	
–  –  (14)
No changes are required to implement the rule under an accrual accounting
regime. In other words, an anti-deficit rule and a constant / rule are equivalent
under accrual accounting.
The results for key variables under the two accounting regimes and 
= 0.5
are presented in Figure 2. As we can see, the two regimes produce equivalent results
despite the fact that deficits are incurred under cash accounting while they are not
under accrual accounting. These findings lead to the (again) well-known policy
implication that key fiscal trajectories under a debt rule are insensitive to the choice
of accounting regimes. We tested the sensitivity of this finding to changes in g and
confirmed that results are similar across regimes when 
= 0. In this case neither
regime records deficits. When 
 = –.0.5, results are again similar although cash
accounting records surpluses, while accrual does not. In addition, we tested different
fiscal rules for debt (for example, declining ) and again found that results were
similar across regimes.
 	
		


It is indeed a virtuous fiscal authority that constrains its actions by rules for
both deficits or debts and capital accumulation. Much more common are situations
where governments specify rules for deficits or debt but are unconstrained with
respect to public sector capital. Indeed, as discussed above, one of the key reasons
periods of deficit reduction, governments using cash accounting simply replaced
fiscal deficits with “infrastructure” deficits by ignoring the depreciation of their
capital.
—————
10 See PSAB (2003).
11 As before, this could be easily thought of as a Debt/GDP rule.
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Financial Assets
Constant  K/R + Debt Rule
–20
–15
–10
–5
0
Cash  (10.00)  (10.50)  (11.03)  (11.58)  (12.16)  (12.76)  (13.40)  (14.07)  (14.77)  (15.51)  (16.29)
Accrual  (10.00)  (10.50)  (11.03)  (11.58)  (12.16)  (12.76)  (13.40)  (14.07)  (14.77)  (15.51)  (16.29)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Capital
Constant  K/R + Debt Rule
0
5
10
15
Cash  10.00  10.50  11.03  11.58  12.16  12.76  13.40  14.07  14.77  15.51  16.29 
Accr ual  10.00  10.50  11.03  11.58  12.16  12.76  13.40  14.07  14.77  15.51  16.29 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Program Expense + Investment
Cash Regime: Constant K/R + Debt  Rule
0
10
20
30
I  0.95  1.00  1.05  1.10  1.16  1.22  1.28  1.34  1.41  1.48  1.55 
SER  2.38  2.50  2.63  2.76  2.89  3.04  3.19  3.35  3.52  3.69  3.88 
TRN  16.17  17.50  18.38  19.29  20.26  21.27  22.33  23.45  24.62  25.86  27.15 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Program Expense + Investment
Accrual Regime: Constant  K/R +  Debt  Rule
0
10
20
30
I  0.95  1.00  1.05  1.10  1.16  1.22  1.28  1.34  1.41  1.48  1.55 
SER  2.38  2.50  2.63  2.76  2.89  3.04  3.19  3.35  3.52  3.69  3.88 
TRN  16.17  17.50  18.38  19.29  20.26  21.27  22.33  23.45  24.62  25.86  27.15 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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In Figure 3 we present results from a simulation where fiscal authorities want
to eliminate an existing deficit but are unconstrained with respect to the level of
public capital. We assume that authorities begin with a deficit equal to $4 billion
(excess transfers) and commit to reduce it by $1 billion per year so that it is
eliminated by the fourth year of their mandate.12 Subject to the deficit elimination
constraint, we assume that authorities’ objective is to maximize operating spending,
 the sum of +.
In any given period, authorities must choose between providing transfers or
investing in additional capital. Whether they operate under a cash or an accrual
accounting regime, authorities’ optimal strategy is to concentrate incremental
spending on transfers. The reason is that under both regimes their deficit target
requires that they forego transfers in the current period to create cash to finance
investment. While the capital stock declines in an equivalent manner under both
regimes, the debt trajectories and mix of spending over time differ. Under accrual
accounting, the cash generated by amortization is used to reduce debt, while under
cash accounting all revenue not allocated to services and debt payments can be spent
on transfers. Thus, under cash accounting, transfer spending is higher.
The policy implication of these simulations is that a fiscal consolidation
program is less stringent under cash accounting than under accrual. The reason is
simply that under cash accounting, authorities are able “finance” a portion of the
adjustment through unrecorded depreciation of capital. Or put another way, a cash
deficit is easier to eliminate than an accrual deficit. Whether such a strategy is
desirable or not depends on one’s perspective. For policy makers searching for the
least politically costly way of eliminating a structural deficit, cash accounting may
be preferable – especially if the period of adjustment is relatively short and the
resulting decline in public sector capital manageable.
 	
	

Of course, it may be that fiscal authorities, especially those who have
achieved fiscal balance, have objectives other than maximizing operating spending.
For example, it may be that authorities wish to maximize capital accumulation
because of the particular political benefits that flow from public investment. In
Figure 4, we present the results of simulation that models such behaviour.
—————
12 In the Canadian parliamentary system, governments customarily call general elections in the fourth year of
their mandate.
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Financial Asssets 
Pro-T ransfers + Eliminate Deficit
–18
–12
–6
0
Cash  (10.00)  (13.00)  (15.00)  (16.00)  (16.00)  (16.00)  (16.00)  (16.00)  (16.00)  (16.00)  (16.00)
Accrual  (10.00)  (12.50)  (14.03)  (14.57)  (14.15)  (13.74)  (13.35)  (12.98)  (12.63)  (12.30)  (11.99)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Capital
Pro-T ransfers + Eliminate Deficit
0
5
10
Cash  10.00  9.50  9.03  8.57  8.15  7.74  7.35  6.98  6.63  6.30  5.99 
Accrual  10.00  9.50  9.03  8.57  8.15  7.74  7.35  6.98  6.63  6.30  5.99 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Program Expense + Investment
Cash Regime: Pro-T ransfer + Eliminate Deficits
0
10
20
30
I  -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -   
SER  2.38  2.50  2.38  2.26  2.14  2.04  1.93  1.84  1.75  1.66  1.58 
TRN  21.12  21.00  21.03  21.15  21.37  22.69  24.07  25.50  27.00  28.57  30.20 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Program Expense + Investment
Accrual Regime: Pro-T ransfer + Eliminate Deficits
0
10
20
30
I  -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -   
SER  2.38  2.50  2.38  2.26  2.14  2.04  1.93  1.84  1.75  1.66  1.58 
TRN  21.12  20.50  20.58  20.74  21.01  22.37  23.79  25.27  26.80  28.40  30.07 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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Financial Assets
Pro-Investment  + No  Deficits
–60
–50
–40
–30
–20
–10
0
Cash  (10.00)  (10.00)  (10.00)  (10.00)  (10.00)  (10.00)  (10.00)  (10.00)  (10.00)  (10.00)  (10.00)
Accrual  (10.00)  (16.80)  (19.96)  (23.26)  (26.73)  (30.37)  (34.20)  (38.21)  (42.45)  (46.88)  (51.53)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Program Expense + Investment
Cash Regime: Pro-Investment  + No Deficits
0
10
20
30
I  0.95  1.83  2.55  3.16  3.69  4.18  4.65  5.10  5.55  6.01  6.47 
SER  2.38  2.50  2.83  3.33  3.95  4.68  5.49  6.38  7.33  8.35  9.44 
TRN  16.17  16.17  16.17  16.17  16.17  16.17  16.17  16.17  16.17  16.17  16.17 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Capital
Pro-Investment + No Deficits
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Cash  10.00  11.33  13.32  15.81  18.71  21.96  25.50  29.33  33.41  37.75  42.34 
Accrual  10.00  16.80  19.96  23.26  26.73  30.37  34.20  38.21  42.45  46.88  51.54 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
<
Program Expense + Investment
Accrual Regime: Pro-Investment + No  Deficits
0
10
20
30
I  10.00  7.30  4.00  4.30  4.63  4.98  5.35  5.72  6.15  6.55  7.00 
SER  2.38  2.50  4.20  4.99  5.82  6.68  7.59  8.55  9.55  10.61  11.72 
TRN  16.17  17.50  16.17  16.17  16.17  16.17  16.17  16.17  16.17  16.17  16.17 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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Constrained only to avoid deficits, the investment maximizing government
would simply eliminate all transfer spending To avoid this unrealistic outcome, we
impose the additional constraint that transfer spending cannot be reduced below its
initial value. Facing these two constraints, the optimal strategy under both
accounting regimes is to hold transfers constant and devote all revenue in excess of
that needed to fund the operation of existing capital and debt service to new
investment.
Although the optimal strategy is common to both accounting regimes, the
fiscal outcomes differ substantially. In the case of cash accounting, no deficits
means no borrowing, so that capital accumulation must be financed out of current
revenue. In the case of accrual accounting, the accumulation of debt-financed capital
does not affect the no-deficit constraint in the current period but only in future
period through its impact of the level of services provided and interest payments on
government debt. Thus, capital accumulation is only constrained by its impact on the
budget constraint in future periods.13
In Figure 4 we see that under cash accounting, government debt remains
constant, while under accrual it grows substantially. Not only is investment higher
under accrual accounting but spending on services from capital is substantially
higher as well. Indeed, we see that by year 10, annual operating expenditures are
higher under accrual than cash accounting by almost seven per cent.
The policy implication from this simulation is that in an environment where
authorities are constrained to maintain budgetary balance, governments who favor
capital accumulation will find an accrual accounting regime more attractive than a
cash regime.
 	



Canada is one of a number of jurisdictions that is making the transition from
cash to accrual accounting for the public sector. The national accounting
profession’s body concerned with accounting standards, the Public Sector
Accounting Board recommends that governments adopt a full accrual accounting
regime and that interested parties focus on five separate measures including net debt
level, annual surplus, change in net debt, accumulated surplus, and statement of cash
flow. A summary of Canadian provinces’ fiscal rules and accounting regimes is
presented in Table 3.
—————
13 Because of the nature of this constraint, the accrual version of the model is no longer recursive. In this
case the model was solved iteratively, by choosing the highest level of investment that avoided an accrual
deficit in the next period.
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Newfoundland Accrual Cash 
deficit/surplus
Nova Scotia Accrual Budget balance over 2 
years, foreign debt 
limits
Accrual 
deficit/surprlus 
and Debt/GDP
New 
Brunswick*
Cash Budget balance over 4 
year term
Cash 
deficit/surplus
Fund 
accounting 
allows savings 
to be treated as 
budgetary 
revenue
Prince Edward 
Island
Accrual Accrual 
deficit/surplus
Quebec Accrual Budget balance over 2 
years
Accrual 
deficit/surplus
Ontario Accrual Budget balance over 2 
years
Accrual 
deficit/surplus
Manitoba Accrual Budget balance over 2 
years, debt targets
Accrual 
deficit/surplus
Fund 
accounting 
allows savings 
to be treated as 
budgetary 
revenue
Saskatchewan* Cash Budget balance over 4 
year tem
Cash 
deficit/surplus
Fund 
accounting 
allows savings 
to be treated as 
budgetary 
revenue
Alberta Accrual Restrictions on deficits 
and debt targets
Accrual 
deficit/surplus plus 
debt level
Debt concept 
does not 
include new 
borrowing for 
capital 
investment
British 
Columbia
Accrual Deficit elimination over 
3 years
Accrual 
deficit/surplus and 
Debt/GDP
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All provinces have either moved from cash to accrual accounting for capital
or have announced their intention to do so. Interestingly, none have announced
changes to the fiscal rules that were put in place under the old accounting regime. At
least three currently use fund rather than fully consolidated accounting so that
transfers from other funds are recorded as budgetary revenue. In addition, only three
of ten provinces focus their budget communications on debt as a key fiscal indicator.
For one of the three, the debt concept targeted does not include borrowing for capital
spending.
Thus, we see that although Canadian provincial governments are moving to
accrual accounting for capital as recommended by national and international
accounting bodies and other organizations, none have made corresponding changes
to their fiscal rules or changed the focus of their budget communications. As a
result, the change in accounting regimes has led to a significant relaxation in the
discipline imposed by fiscal rules on authorities. Although it is too soon to measure
with any confidence, anecdotal evidence suggests that some provincial governments
are using the change in accounting regime to expand capital spending substantially.
  	
The results in this paper will not be surprising to students of fiscal policy.
Turning first to positive issues, because fiscal balance means different things under
the two accounting regimes, rules that discourage or prohibit deficit financing are
harder to satisfy under cash accounting and easier to satisfy under accrual
accounting. However, fiscal rules that focus on net debt provide the same degree of
fiscal discipline under both regimes.
Depending on 1) current fiscal circumstances (, is the government
embarking on a program of fiscal consolidation and/or debt reduction?), 2)
preferences with respect to spending on capital-based services versus transfers to
individuals and organizations, and 3) the trajectory of revenues ( are revenues
growing, shrinking or static?), authorities will prefer some combinations of
accounting regimes and fiscal rules over others. For example, in periods of fiscal
consolidation authorities seeking to satisfy an anti-deficit rule will prefer cash
accounting because it allows some of the “deficit” to be eliminated through
(unmeasured) depreciation of public sector capital. In periods of fiscal balance,
authorities seeking to satisfy an anti-deficit rule will prefer accrual accounting
because it allows the overall level of government spending to be higher while
maintaining fiscal balance.
Turning next to normative issues, it is clear that accountability is best served
if changes in public sector accounting regimes are accompanied by corresponding
changes to (or, at least, clarification of) fiscal rules. Qualitative evidence from
Canada suggests that this is not always the case. It is unrealistic to expect that
legislators, the media and the public will be able to change their fiscal policy focus
 3DXO%RRWKH
from a single measure, the government balance under cash accounting, to the
multiple measures under accrual accounting suggested by some professional
accounting bodies. Accountability might be best maintained if government adopted
net debt measures as their primary fiscal indicator when operating in an accrual
accounting environment.
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